Hengaw special report on widespread human rights violations in Iran, 2025

Hengaw - Tuesday, December 30, 2025

Hengaw Organization for Human Rights has released a comprehensive report examining the state of human rights in Iran throughout 2025, documenting serious and widespread violations of fundamental rights. This statistical report, compiled using data recorded by the Statistics and Documentation Center of Hengaw Organization for Human Rights, highlights a marked escalation in executions, arbitrary arrests, systemic violence, and other grave human rights abuses across the country.

Section 1

Introduction 

According to data recorded by the Statistics and Documentation Center of Hengaw Organization for Human Rights, in 2025:

• At least 1,858 prisoners were executed.
• At least 74 civilians were killed by direct gunfire from government forces.
• At least 59 individuals died while in detention facilities.
• At least 46 civilians were killed or injured as a result of landmines and unexploded ordnance.
• At least 1,552 individuals, whose identities were fully verified, were arrested, or forcibly disappeared.
• At least 24 political activists and protesters were sentenced to death.
• At least 454 political, civil, and religious activists were sentenced to imprisonment and flogging.
• At least 207 women were killed by family members as a result of domestic violence.
• This report covers the killing of a queer woman and a brief overview of the conditions facing queer people in Iran.

Hengaw Organization for Human Rights will publish detailed, issue-specific reports addressing each of these areas in the coming days.

Section 2

Execution of at least 1,858 prisoners in 2025

Based on the documents, Iranian authorities carried out the executions of at least 1,858 prisoners in prisons across the country in 2025. This figure represents an increase of more than 100 percent compared to 2024, when 909 prisoners were executed in Iran.

Key points on execution statistics:

The identities of 1,796 executed prisoners have been confirmed, while the identities of 62 prisoners remain under verification.

• At least 55 women were executed.
• At least one child offender was executed.
• Only 75 executions were officially announced by state-affiliated media.
• At least 81 prisoners were executed secretly and without access to a final family visit.
• The death sentences of at least 11 prisoners were carried out in public.

Charges leading to execution:

• Political, religious, and espionage-related charges: 43 prisoners
• Premeditated murder: 915 prisoners
• Drug-related crimes: 852 prisoners
• Rape: 36 prisoners
• Armed robbery: 12 prisoners
• Economic-related charges: 1 prisoner

Breakdown of executed prisoners by national and ethnic background:

• Kurdish prisoners: 264
• Lor prisoners: 239
• Turkish prisoners: 164
• Baloch prisoners: 142
• Gilak prisoners: 92
• Arab prisoners: 73
• Turkmen prisoners: 13
• Tat prisoners: 5
• Qashqai prisoners: 2
• Ethnicity not confirmed by Hengaw: 271
• Persian (Fars) prisoners: 506
• Prisoners holding Afghan nationality: 85

Section 3

At least 74 civilians killed by government gunfire in Iran in 2025

Over the past year, the killing of civilians by direct gunfire from Iranian government forces, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Basij, law enforcement forces, and the police, increased significantly compared to previous years. The highest number of these killings occurred amid the heightened security environment across Iran during the 12-day Iran–Israel war.

In 2025, at least 74 civilians were killed by direct gunfire from government forces. This figure represents an increase of at least 46 cases, equivalent to a 164 percent rise, compared to the previous year.

According to the documents:

• At least 59.5 percent of the civilians killed—44 cases—were Baloch.
• At least 15 Kurdish civilians, accounting for 20 percent, were also among those killed.
• At least six women were killed by direct gunfire from government forces.
• At least three children were killed during the past year by direct gunfire from government forces. Their identities are as follows:

1. Yousef Shelibar, 5 years old, from Iranshahr
2. Raha Sheikhi, 4 years old, from Khomein
3. Zolfaghar Sharifi, 7 years old, from Hoveyzeh

Notably, at least 40 of these civilians were killed within a 40-day period following the outbreak of the Iran–Israel war, as a result of the militarization of cities, particularly the establishment of checkpoints at city entrances by government forces. These cases account for 55 percent of all civilian killings recorded in 2025.

Section 4

Prison conditions in Iran: at least 59 prisoner deaths in 2025

At least 59 prisoners died in Iranian prisons in 2025. Compared to the previous year, this represents an increase of at least 37 cases, equivalent to a 168 percent rise.

• Brief statistical overview:
• At least seven prisoners, including three Kurds, died as a result of torture.
• Based on Hengaw’s data, 34 prisoners died due to lack of medical care.
• At least 11 prisoners died by suicide in Iranian prisons.
• At least eight political prisoners, including three Kurds and two Arabs, died in custody.

According to Hengaw’s statistics:

• At least 21 of the deceased prisoners, accounting for 35.5 percent of the total cases, were Kurdish prisoners.
• Eight Baloch, four Gilak, four Arab, and two Lor prisoners also died.
• At least two foreign nationals, from Switzerland and Afghanistan, died in Iranian prisons.
• At least 13 Persian prisoners died, while no precise identity information was available for five prisoners.

Section 5

Verified identification of 1,552 detained individuals in 2025

In 2025, 1,552 people were arrested or abducted by government institutions of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and their full identities have been verified by Hengaw. This figure includes only individuals detained for political, cultural, civil, and religious reasons whose full identities have been confirmed.

Breakdown of detainees by national and ethnic minority groups:

Of the 1,546 detainees whose full identities were verified, at least 727 cases—equivalent to 47% of all verified detentions—were Kurds.

• 729 Kurds detained
• 272 Persians detained
• 256 Baloch detained
• 79 Lors detained
• 74 Arabs detained
• 55 Turks detained
• 33 Gilaks detained
• 15 foreign nationals detained
• 5 Sistani people detained
• 4 Qashqai people detained
• 2 Turkmen detained
• In 24 cases, Hengaw has not been able to verify the detainees’ ethnic identity with precision.

Detention of children:

In 2025, based on Hengaw’s data, at least 48 children under the age of 18 were detained by Iranian state institutions, with more than 98% of them being Kurdish, Baloch, and Lor children. Three of the detained children were girls (three Kurdish girls), and 45 were boys.

• Kurdish children: 25 cases, equivalent to 52% of all detained children
• Baloch children: 18 cases, equivalent to 37.5% of all detained children
• Lor children: 4 cases, equivalent to 8.5% of all detained children
• Arab children: 1 case, equivalent to 2% of all detained children

Further details on the detention of 167 women:

Based on Hengaw’s data, in 2025 at least 167 women activists were detained, representing 10.5% of all detentions recorded that year.

• At least 51 Baha’i women detained
• At least 41 Kurdish women detained
• At least 14 Gilak women detained

Further details on the detention of 177 religious-minority activists:

In 2025, at least 177 people were detained by Iranian state forces due to religious activities, most of them followers of the Baha’i faith and Sunni Islam.

• 82 Baha’i activists detained
• 58 Sunni activists detained
• 21 followers of the Yamani movement detained
• 8 Christian converts detained
• 5 Yarsan followers detained
• 3 dissenting Shi’a clerics detained

Further details on the detention of labour activists, artists, and lawyers:

• At least 41 teachers and university lecturers detained
• At least 19 university students detained
• At least 14 lawyers detained
• At least 21 media activists and journalists detained
• At least 45 artists and writers detained

Section 6

Victims of landmine explosions in 2025

In 2025, at least 46 individuals in Iran were victims of explosions caused by landmines or explosive remnants of war. These incidents involved landmines left over from the Iran–Iraq war, mines planted by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), as well as unexploded munitions from the 12-day Iran–Israel war.

By comparison, at least 57 people were reported as victims of landmine explosions in the previous year.

Of this number:

• 20 people were killed.
• 26 people were injured or suffered amputations.
• 23 cases—equivalent to 50% of the victims—involved women and children.

Victim breakdown:

• At least 18 children under the age of 18 were affected, five of whom were killed.
• At least five women, including three girls under the age of 18, were among the victims.
• At least 16 Kurds were among the victims.
• At least 11 Baloch and 10 Lors were among the victims.
• At least three Afghan nationals and three Arabs were among the victims.

These figures underscore the continued danger posed by landmines and unexploded ordnance in Iran, particularly in border regions and less-developed areas.

Section 7

Issuance of harsh sentences: death, imprisonment, and flogging for political, civil, and religious activists

In 2025, at least 454 political, civil, and religious activists were tried by the judicial system of the Islamic Republic of Iran and sentenced to punishments including death, imprisonment, and flogging. More than 49% of those tried and sentenced to prison (219 cases) were Kurdish activists. At least 30 of these individuals were sentenced to death; the sentences of six were overturned on appeal, and the death sentences of two were carried out.

Among the 26 individuals who still face the death penalty:

• 5 Gilak
• 5 Kurdish
• 3 Baloch
• 3 Arab
• 2 Turkish
• 3 Persian (Fars)

Three women prisoners — Nasim Eslamazahi (Baloch), Zahra Shahbaz Tabari (Gilak), and Sharifeh Mohammadi (Turkish) — were also sentenced to death. Although Sharifeh Mohammadi’s death sentence was overturned and commuted to 30 years in prison, the other two women remain at risk of execution.

In addition:

These 454 political, religious, and civil activists were also sentenced to imprisonment, flogging, and social deprivations.

In total, they received:

• 1,766 years and 11 days of discretionary imprisonment (ta’zir)
• 32 years and 8 months of suspended imprisonment
• 11 of them were sentenced in total to 728 lashes

Sentences issued against national and ethnic minorities:

At least 219 Kurdish activists were sentenced in total to 580 years, 11 months, and 21 days of discretionary imprisonment, 29 years and 8 months of suspended imprisonment, and 188 lashes. In addition, 10 Kurdish activists were sentenced to death; the death sentences of five were overturned and they are awaiting new rulings.

• At least 31 Turkish activists were sentenced in total to 158 years in prison, and two were sentenced to death.
• At least 24 Lor activists were sentenced to 103 years and 8 months in prison, and one was sentenced to death.
• At least 19 Arab activists were sentenced in total to 172 years and 8 months in prison, and three were sentenced to death.
• At least 11 Gilak activists were sentenced to 18 years, 8 months, and 17 days in prison, and five Gilak activists were sentenced to death.
• At least 6 Baloch activists were sentenced to 26 years and 6 months in prison, and three were sentenced to death.

Additional details:

• Two 17-year-old Kurdish and Baloch minors were sentenced in total to 12 years in prison.
• At least 78 women were sentenced in total to 354 years, 10 months, and 12 days of discretionary imprisonment, 9 years of suspended imprisonment, and 252 lashes; two women were also sentenced to death.
• At least 12 media activists were sentenced to 26 years, 6 months, and 15 days of discretionary imprisonment.

Religious minorities:

• At least 15 Christian converts were sentenced in total to 139 years and 2 months in prison and 174 lashes.
• At least 29 Baha’i activists were sentenced in total to 142 years, 2 months, and 17 days of discretionary imprisonment.
• At least 29 Sunni activists were sentenced in total to 92 years and 5 months of discretionary imprisonment, 9 years of suspended imprisonment, and three were sentenced to death.

Section 8

At least 59 kolbars killed or injured in 2025

According to data recorded by the Statistics and Documentation Center of Hengaw Organization for Human Rights, at least 59 kolbars were killed or injured during 2025 in the border regions of Kermanshah (Kermashan), Kurdistan (Sanandaj), and West Azerbaijan (Urmia) provinces. This figure represents a decrease of at least 280 cases, or 82.5 percent, compared to the previous year. In 2024, at least 339 kolbars and informal border traders were killed.

The report indicates that at least 25 kolbars were killed, accounting for 42.5 percent of the total cases, while at least 34 others were injured.

At least 49 cases, representing 83 percent of all recorded killings and injuries, resulted from direct gunfire by the armed forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Four kolbars were killed due to natural hazards, while three others died as a result of landmine explosions. Three additional cases were caused by traffic accidents, cardiac arrest, and physical assault.

Further details:

• At least two 17-year-old child kolbars were injured in the border areas of Nosud and Baneh.
• The highest number of casualties was recorded in the border areas of Baneh County, with 23 cases.
• Kurdistan Province (Sanandaj) accounted for the largest share of casualties, with 43 cases, representing 73 percent of the total.

Section 9

At least 207 femicide cases recorded in Iran in 2025

Based on data recorded by the Statistics and Documentation Center of Hengaw Organization for Human Rights, at least 207 cases of femicide were documented in Iran in 2025. Of these cases, 31 femicides (14.5 percent) were carried out with motives linked to what is described as so-called “honor.”

Further details:

• At least 13 women were killed after rejecting marriage proposals.
• At least 10 women were killed by their husbands after requesting divorce.
• At least 10 women, identified as victims of child marriage, were killed by their husbands.
• At least seven women, identified as victims of forced marriage, were killed.

Provinces with the highest number of recorded femicide cases:

• Tehran: 32 cases
• Mazandaran, Kermanshah, Razavi Khorasan, and West Azerbaijan (Urmia): 14 cases each
• East Azerbaijan, Fars, and Sistan and Baluchestan: 11 cases each
• Gilan and Lorestan: 10 cases each
• Kerman: 7 cases
• Khuzestan and Alborz: 6 cases each

In most cases, the perpetrators were individuals closest to the victims, including current or former husbands, fathers, brothers, and other family members.

These femicide cases are recorded in a context shaped by the anti-women laws of the Islamic Republic of Iran and entrenched patriarchal and honor-based social norms, which push a significant number of femicides into the realm of hidden statistics. Under international standards, wherever femicide data are inaccurate and judicial transparency is lacking, a broader and more severe crisis is likely underway.

Moreover, in the absence of effective legal mechanisms, independent civil society and non-governmental organizations remain the primary actors capable of documenting femicide cases. In many parts of Iran, such organizations do not exist, which is one of the reasons why reliable statistical data on femicide are unavailable in certain regions.

Section 10

Situation of sexual and gender minorities

Under the laws of the Islamic Republic of Iran, same-sex relations are criminalized and punishable by penalties ranging from flogging to the death penalty.

The free expression of gender identity by transgender individuals is criminalized through the enforcement of compulsory hijab laws under the Islamic Penal Code, as well as through the state-imposed gender binary and the denial of self-determined gender identity in Iran.

So-called “sex change” surgeries, as framed by the Islamic Republic, which in reality constitute gender affirmation and legal gender alignment, remain far below international medical and human-rights standards. Reports indicate that coercive and torturous practices are still used within these processes.

No accurate or comprehensive data is available regarding the number of imprisoned individuals from sexual and gender minority communities.

The status and conditions of transgender prisoners previously held in Evin Prison remain unclear following their transfer to Qarchak and Shahr-e Rey prisons and their subsequent return to Evin.

There is no reliable statistical data on killings of queer individuals based on sexual orientation or gender identity. This absence of data reflects the systemic lack of transparency within Iran’s judiciary, the role of state-controlled media, and the complicity of patriarchal family structures aligned with the government.

In 2025, Hengaw Organization for Human Rights documented the case of a transfemicide in Shiraz, recording the grave circumstances surrounding the killing of transgender woman Sogand Pakdel.

Section 11

Conclusion

Based on documented data and evidence of systematic human rights violations in Iran throughout 2025, Hengaw Organization for Human Rights assesses the current human rights situation in the country as grave. This assessment is particularly acute in the period following the Iran–Israel war, during which repression and state violence have further intensified.

Systematic killings carried out by the Islamic Republic have not only increased over the past year but have also surpassed levels recorded in previous decades. At the same time, repressive practices have grown more severe, accompanied by a notable rise in accusations of alleged “collaboration with Israel,” which have increasingly been used as a tool of repression.

Despite the existence of underreported and concealed cases of killings of women, data documented by Hengaw continue to show an upward trend compared with previous years. A comprehensive assessment of both recorded findings and hidden data further indicates that repression targeting national and ethnic minorities, religious minorities, and sexual and gender minorities remains severe.

In this context, Hengaw calls on civil society in Iran and the international community to establish effective mechanisms to accurately assess the alarming escalation of executions and broader patterns of repression in the country. Given the multilayered nature of structures of oppression and repression in Iran, particular attention must be paid to the disproportionate impact of state violence on minorities and other marginalized groups.